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1 Introduction
theory AnselmGod
imports Main
begin
This paper presents an automated verification of Anselm’s ontological ar-
gument, as reconstructed by Paul Oppenheimer and Edward Zalta [5], in
Isabelle/HOL, an interactive theorem prover for higher-order logic. Pre-
viously, the argument has being automated by Oppenheimer and Zalta in
Prover9 [6], an automated theorem prover for first-order logic, and by John
Rushby in PVS [8], an automated theorem prover for higher-order logic.
Automations of other versions of the argument include [1], [9] and [3]. My
purpose here is to present a basis for comparison in the spirit of [10], which
compares automated proofs of the irrationality of
√
2.
Oppenheimer and Zalta’s reconstruction is based on the idea of treating
‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’ as a definite description,
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and treating definite descriptions as singular terms. But in Isabelle/HOL all
terms, including definite descriptions, are assumed to denote. So the main
task is to embed a free logic for definite descriptions within Isabelle/HOL.
(Previously, a free logic has been embedded into Isabelle/HOL by Christoph
Benzmuller and Dana Scott [2]. But theirs differs from Zalta and Oppen-
heimer’s in several ways). Once Isabelle/HOL is equipped with free definite
descriptions, reconstructing the argument is straightforward.
2 Free Logic
Isabelle treats definite descriptions as singular terms of the form THE x .
ϕ x. However, all terms in Isabelle are assumed to denote, and so from
universal elimination we have the validity of the argument form:
lemma ∀ x . ψ x =⇒ ψ (THE x . ϕ x ) by (rule allE )
In the presence of definite descriptions which do not denote, this argument
form is invalid; for example, from ‘everyone has hair’ we should not infer
‘the present King of France has hair’, since the present King of France does
not exist.
This problem can be avoided by introducing a null individual n to serve as
the reference of non-denoting definite descriptions, as follows:
typedecl i — the type of individuals
consts n:: i (n) — the null individual
Then the universal and particular quantifiers can be restricted to individuals
excluding the null-individual as follows, where the new free quantifiers are
distinguished from the classical quantifiers by bold type:
abbreviation universal-quantifier :: (i ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool (∀ )
where ∀ ϕ ≡ ∀ x ::i . (¬ x = n −→ ϕ x )
abbreviation universal-syntax :: (i ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool (binder ∀ [8 ] 9 )
where ∀ x . ϕ x ≡ ∀ ϕ
abbreviation particular-quantifier :: (i ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool (∃ )
where ∃ ϕ ≡ ∃ x ::i . (x 6= n ∧ ϕ x )
abbreviation particular-syntax :: (i ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool (binder ∃ [8 ] 9 )
where ∃ x . ϕ x ≡ ∃ ϕ
Note that the quantifiers here range over both existent and non-existent in-
dividuals, whereas the quantifiers in [2] range only over existent individuals.
In the free logic employed by Oppenheimer and Zalta, statements of identity
in which terms do not denote are always false [5], p. 511. So the domain of
the identity relation should be restricted to exclude the null-individual:
abbreviation identity :: i ⇒ i ⇒ bool (is)
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where is x y ≡ x 6= n ∧ x = y
abbreviation identity-syntax :: i ⇒ i ⇒ bool (infix = 50 )
where x = y ≡ is x y
Once identity is introduced, the uniqueness quantifier can then be defined
in the usual way:
abbreviation uniqueness-quantifier :: (i ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool (unique)
where unique ϕ ≡ (∃ x ::i . ϕ x ∧ (∀ y ::i . ϕ y −→ x = y))
abbreviation uniqueness-syntax :: (i ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool (binder unique [8 ] 9 )
where unique x . ϕ x ≡ unique ϕ
Finally, the logic employed by Oppenheimer and Zalta is a negative free logic,
in that applications of atomic predicates to non-denoting terms are always
false [5], p. 511. So it’s necessary to introduce a higher-order predicate
distinguishing between atomic and non-atomic predicates, and to introduce
an axiom stipulating that no atomic predicate is true of the null individual:
consts atomic-predicates:: (i ⇒ bool) ⇒ bool (atomic)
axiomatization where negativity-constraint : atomic ϕ =⇒ ¬ ϕ n
In addition, it has to be stated that identity is atomic:
axiomatization where identity-atomic:
∧
x . atomic (is x )
One of the most controversial premises of the ontological argument is that
‘exists’ is a genuine or atomic predicate. But surprisingly, we shall see below
that the argument does not require this premise.
3 Definite Descriptions
The main idea of Oppenheimer and Zalta’s reconstruction of the ontological
argument is to treat definite descriptions as genuine singular terms, which
leads to the following syntax in Isabelle/HOL:
consts definite-description:: (i ⇒ bool) ⇒ i (τ )
abbreviation description-syntax :: (i ⇒ bool) ⇒ i (binder τ [8 ] 9 )
where τ x . ϕ x ≡ τ ϕ
In Oppenheimer and Zalta’s reconstruction of the argument, definite de-
scriptions are governed by the Russellian axiom schema [5], p. 513:
axiomatization where description-axiom:
atomic ψ =⇒ ψ (τ x . ϕ x ) ≡ (∃ x . ϕ x ∧ (∀ y . ϕ y −→ x = y) ∧ ψ x )
From this axiom schema, Oppenheimer and Zalta derive two intermediary
theorems to be used in the reconstruction of their argument [5], pp. 513-4.
According to the first:
theorem description-theorem-1 : unique x . ϕ x =⇒ ∃ y . y = (τ x . ϕ x )
using description-axiom identity-atomic by blast
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The second theorem follows directly from the following lemma:
lemma lemma-1 : a = (τ x . ϕ x ) =⇒ ϕ (τ x . ϕ x )
using description-axiom identity-atomic by blast
theorem description-theorem-2 : ∃ x . x = (τ x . ϕ x ) =⇒ ϕ (τ x . ϕ x )
by (simp add : lemma-1 )
In the course of verifying the argument using Prover9, Oppenheimer and
Zalta discovered a simplified proof which uses instead [6], p. 345:
theorem description-theorem-3 :
atomic ψ =⇒ ψ (τ x . ϕ x ) =⇒ ∃ y . y = (τ x . ϕ x )
using negativity-constraint by fastforce
Notice that it is only this last theorem which presupposes the negativity
constraint, whereas the first two theorems depend only on the atomicity of
identity.
4 Anselm’s Argument
The argument proper employs the following non-logical vocabulary:
consts existence:: i ⇒ bool (E ) — exists in reality
consts greater-than:: i⇒i⇒bool (G) — is greater than
consts conceivable:: i⇒bool (C ) — exists in the understanding
Note that E a is not intended by Oppenheimer and Zalta to be equivalent
to ∃ x . a = x since according to their reading of the argument, some things
do not exist in reality [5], p. 514.
Finally, the presentation of the argument is simplified by introducing the
following abbreviation for the predicate ‘is a being greater than which none
can be conceived’:
abbreviation none-greater-than :: i⇒bool (Φ)
where Φ x ≡ (C x ∧ ¬(∃ y . G y x ∧ C y))
With this vocabulary in place, a name for God can be introduced as an
abbreviation for the description ‘the being greater than which none can be
conceived’:
definition g :: i where g ≡ (τ x . Φ x )
In Oppenheimer and Zalta’s presentation every name is assumed to denote,
so a name for God cannot be introduced until it is proved that the description
τx . Φ x denotes [5], p, 520. But since it’s not assumed in this presentation
that every name denotes or, in other words, since it’s not assumed that no
names denote the null individual, it’s not necessary to postpone this step.
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The final quasi-logical premise in Oppenheimer and Zalta’s reconstruction
of the argument is the connectivity of ‘is greater than’, which is used in the
proof of the following lemma [5], p. 518:
lemma lemma-2 :
assumes connectivity : ∀ x . ∀ y . G x y ∨ G y x ∨ x = y
shows ∃ x . Φ x =⇒ unique x . Φ x
using connectivity by blast
Note that connectivity disallows any ties with respect to greatness. This
is implausible, since you and I, for example, may be equally great, without
being the same person. So connectivity should not be thought of as merely
stipulative, and a weaker premise would be desirable.
With this vocabulary in place, Anselm’s ontological argument, as recon-
structed by Oppenheimer and Zalta, can be stated as follows:
theorem
assumes premise-1 : ∃ x . Φ x
— there exists in the understanding a being greater than which none can be
conceived
and premise-2 : ¬ E (τ x . Φ x ) −→ (∃ y . G y (τ x . Φ x ) ∧ C y)
— if the being greater than which none can be conceived does not exist in reality,
then a being exists in the understanding which is greater than the being greater
than which none can be conceived
and connectivity : ∀ x . ∀ y . G x y ∨ G y x ∨ x = y
shows E g — God exists.
Isabelle can verify the argument in one line with the command using premise-1
premise-2 connectivity lemma-1 g-def description-theorem-1 by smt. But
since proofs in Isabelle using smt are currently considered impermanent, I
instead give Zalta and Oppenheimer’s handwritten proof [6], p. 337:
proof (rule ccontr)
assume atheism: ¬ E g
from premise-1 and connectivity and lemma-2 have unique x . Φ x by simp
with description-theorem-1 have ∃ y . y = (τ x . Φ x ) by simp
with description-theorem-2 have Φ (τ x . Φ x ) by simp
hence god-is-greatest : ¬(∃ y . G y (τ x . Φ x ) ∧ C y) by (rule conjE )
from atheism and premise-2 and g-def have (∃ y . G y (τ x . Φ x ) ∧ C y) by
simp
with god-is-greatest show False..
qed
Note that neither Oppenheimer and Zalta’s proof nor the one line smt proof
depend on the negativity constraint or whether any of the non-logical vo-
cabulary is atomic (though they do depend indirectly on the atomicity of
identity).
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5 The Prover9 Argument
In the course of verifying the argument using Prover9, Oppenheimer and
Zalta discovered a simplified version which employs only premise-2, but not
premise-1 or the connectivity of ‘greater than’ [6].
theorem
assumes premise-2 : ¬ E (τ x . Φ x ) −→ (∃ y . G y (τ x . Φ x ) ∧ C y)
shows E g nitpick [user-axioms] oops
However, Isabelle not only fails to verify this argument, but finds a coun-
terexample using nitpick. The reason is that it needs to be specified that
‘greater than’ is atomic, in order for description-theorem-3 to be applicable:
theorem Prover9Argument :
assumes premise-2 : ¬ E (τ x . Φ x ) −→ (∃ y . G y (τ x . Φ x ) ∧ C y)
and G-atomic:
∧
x . atomic (G x )
shows E g
Once the atomicity of ‘greater than’ is added as a premise, a call to sledge-
hammer suggests the following two-step proof, which Isabelle verifies easily:
proof −
have C g ∧ (∀ i . i = n ∨ ¬ G i g ∨ ¬ C i) ∨ n = g
by (metis (lifting , full-types) g-def lemma-1 )
then show ?thesis
by (metis (lifting) G-atomic g-def negativity-constraint premise-2 )
qed
If provided with all premises, sledgehammer still suggests a proof using only
premise-2 :
theorem
assumes connectivity : ∀ x . ∀ y . G x y ∨ G y x ∨ x = y
and premise-1 : ∃ x . Φ x
and premise-2 : ¬ E (τ x . Φ x ) −→ (∃ y . G y (τ x . Φ x ) ∧ C y)
and G-atomic:
∧
x . atomic (G x )
shows E g
proof −
have Φ g ∨ n = g
by (metis (lifting , full-types) g-def lemma-1 )
then show ?thesis
by (metis (lifting) G-atomic g-def negativity-constraint premise-2 )
qed
Note that this version of the argument does employ the negativity-constraint,
as well as the premise that identity is atomic via lemma-1. So although it
has less non-logical premises than the original version of the argument, it
has more, and more controversial, logical premises.
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6 Soundness
Since premise-1 and the connectivity of ‘is greater than’ are both dispens-
able, and the atomicity of ‘is greater than’ is not especially controversial, the
main non-logical premise of the argument turns out to be premise-2. Note
that premise-2 is entailed by God’s existence:
theorem
assumes theism: E g
shows ¬ E (τ x . Φ x ) −→ (∃ y . G y (τ x . Φ x ) ∧ C y)
using g-def theism by auto
So under the supposition that ‘is greater than’ is atomic, premise-2 is equiv-
alent to God’s existence, suggesting an atheist might wish to reject it as
question-begging (see [6], pp. 348-9 and [4] for more detailed discussion of
this point).
However, Ted Parent has pointed out that premise-2 need not stand on its
own, but may be further supported by the following argument [7], p. 478:
lemma
assumes premise-3 : ∀ y . ∀ z . ((E y ∧ ¬ E z ) −→ ((y = (τ x . Φ x ) ∨ z = (τ x . Φ
x )) −→ y = (τ x . Φ x ))) and something-exists: ∃ x . E x and god-is-conceivable:
C g and C-atomic: atomic C
shows ¬ E (τ x . Φ x ) −→ (∃ y . C y ∧ G y (τ x . Φ x ))
by (metis (no-types, lifting) C-atomic description-theorem-3 g-def god-is-conceivable
premise-3 something-exists)
But as Parent says, the premise that ‘exists in the understanding’ is atomic
is particularly questionable. If ‘exists in the understanding’ is atomic, then it
follows from description-theorem-3 that, for example, if the largest positive
integer exists in the understanding, then something is the largest positive
integer. But since ‘the largest positive integer’ is a grammatical description,
there is a case to be made that the largest positive integer does exist in
the understanding, even though nothing is the largest positive integer [7], p.
480-1.
7 Conclusion
The main difference between Oppenheimer and Zalta’s reconstruction of the
argument in Prover9 and the reconstruction presented here in Isabelle/HOL
is that whereas Prover9 employs first-order logic, Isabelle/HOL employs
higher-order logic. That means that the Russellian description-axiom schema
can be stated directly in Isabelle/HOL, whereas in Prover9 it has to be rep-
resented indirectly using first-order quantifiers ranging over predicates and
relations [6], pp. 338-41.
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Because of the way Oppenheimer and Zalta carry out this embedding, it is
presupposed in their presentation that all the non-logical predicates which
occur in their argument are atomic. In contrast, in the presentation in
Isabelle/HOL, whenever the assumption that a certain predicate is atomic
is needed, this has to be made explicit as a premise of the argument. This
is not a merely practical matter since, as Parent points out, the question of
whether ‘exists in the understanding’ is an atomic predicate turns out to be
crucial.
Abstracting from the peculiarities of different software, a surprising result
is that whereas every version of the argument requires the premise that
identity is atomic, and some versions require the additional premises that
‘is greater than’ is atomic and ‘exists in the understanding’ is atomic, no
version of the argument requires the premises that ‘exists in reality’, or in
other words ‘exists’ simpliciter, is atomic. This is in spite of the fact that
the question of whether ‘exists’ is a genuine predicate has historically being
one of the most controversial questions raised by Anselm’s argument.
end
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